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DECOLONIZATION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
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by Gaston V. Rimlinger 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The worldwide decolonization drive after World War I1 marked the end 
of the colonial system that had been forged largely in the late nineteenth- 
century scramble among the major European powers over the division of 
the African territory. Starting with the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1957, new 
sovereign states emerged from artificial colonial jurisdictions in one area 
after another. There are now thirty-six black African countries, all but two 
(Liberia and Ethiopia) of which have become independent since 1957. The 
advent of independence in Africa naturally raised anticipations of great 
economic and social change. There were hopes and expectations that once 
the shackles of colonialism were removed, the new countries could mobilize 
productive energies that would lift the masses out of illiteracy and poverty. 
But informed observers had no illusions about the enormous development 
problems that lay ahead, some of which were legacies of the colonial 
economic system. 
Although there was considerable variation in colonial practice, it had 
been marked everywhere by political, economic, racial, and social in- 
equalities. Europeans from the metropolitan countries were naturally in 
the dominant positions; they occupied all of the well-paying jobs in govern- 
ment and private enterprises. Only in East Africa, mainly in Kenya, did 
Europeans play a major role as farmers and ranchers, and there they occu- 
pied the choice coffee-growing highlands. (We are not concerned in this 
essay with white-ruled South African countries.) In francophone West 
Africa, it was not uncommon to find French men and women, the so-called 
"petits blancs," in lesser economic positions in trade and the services. The 
middle economic and social layer, however, was generally occupied by non- 
European immigrants. In West Africa the Levantines (Lebanese, Syrians, 
Cypriots) and in East Africa the Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) controlled 
much of the trade, transport, and small industries. The overwhelming 
majority of the Africans were on the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. 
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The Europeans used their dominant positions t o  keep the other groups in 
subordinate positions, notwithstanding the fact that European-run schooIs 
helped to educate a thin African elite. In many colonies Africans were 
legally prevented from occupying certain positions or engaging in economic 
pursuits that might compete with European interests. They were mainly 
relegated to peasant farming and unskilled labor. In spite of that, they 
often had to pay a disproportionate share of the tax burden, either in cash 
or through forced labor, and received far less than a proportionate share 
of government services. 
Until the later years of the colonial era, colonial administrations did not 
seriously aim a t  the general development of their territories. Their concern 
with development was chiefly motivated by the desire to make the colonies 
generate enough income to meet administrative expenses. The economic 
and social infrastructure which the government financed was oriented 
toward support of a law-and-order type of administration and toward 
export-related agriculture and mining, The construction of internal means 
of transport, such as railroads, was mainly for the purpose of evacuating 
crops and minerals, whose production and/or marketing was under the 
control of business interests from the metropolitan countries. The newly 
independent countries have sought to reverse this pattern of external 
control and dependence with their ambitious development plans. In theory, 
at least, they have aimed a t  both economic development and equality. The 
Second National Development PIan (1970-1974) of Nigeria, for instance, 
includes in its objectives the creation of "a just and equalitarian society" 
and "a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens."' 
We are now in the middle of the second decade of independence for most 
African countries, and this may be an appropriate time to ask how much 
development has taken place and more specifically who has benefited from 
it. The main concern of this essay is with the second half of the question. 
The issue of the distribution of the gains from development and modern- 
ization has received increasing attention in recent years from students of 
development. Most of the developing world has become painfully aware 
that after a quarter of a century of international developmental activity, the 
gap between rich and poor, both internationally and within countries, seems 
to be widening rather than narrowing. The African countries seem to 
follow the general pattern. A fundamental question which arises is whether 
the direction of change in the institutional framework inherited from 
colonial times tends to perpetuate or to eliminate gross economic inequality. 
No doubt a great deal of change has occurred, and many Africans have 
risen to positions of power and affluence. The question is, how much has 
the average African shared in the fruits of development? Unfortunately, 
there are only scattered data available on income distribution in Africa. 
Much of the argument, therefore, has to be inferred from participation or 
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TABLE 1 
DEVELOPMENT LEVEL INDICATORS FOR 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Percentage of 
1970 per capita Percentage Enrollment among Percentage 
G D P a t  1960 \hare of mfg school-agech~ldren of ilhterates 
market prices and crafts in In primary and (aged 15 
(US dollars) 1970 G D P  secondary schools and over) 
WEST AFRICA 
Dahomey 88 7 20 95.4 
G a m b ~ a  120 2 19 90.0 
Ghana 172 17 52 75.0 
Ivory Coast 22 1 13 40 80.0 
Liberia 210 6 45 91.1 
Mall 50 12 15 97.8 
Mauritania 129 2 4 95.0 
Nlger 7 1 6 8 95.0 
Nigeria 75 9 19 88.5 
Senegal 171 16 23 90.0 
Slerra Leone 165 6 19 90.0 
Togo 147 12 37 95.0 
Upper Volta 40 10 7 95.0 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
Burund~ 44 5 18 90.0 
Cameroon 136 16 52 85.0 
Congo P.R. 1 74 I3 73 80.0 
Chad 5 1 8 8 94.4 
Gabon 460 7 78 88.0 
Rwanda 47 4 40 90.0 
Zaire 100 19 54 83.5 
EAST AFRICA 
Botswana 95 I I 60 67.1 
Ethiopia 62 1 1  8 95.0 
Kenya 125 15 30 80.0 
Lesotho 64 1 66 41.4 
Madagaxar 109 I I 44 66.5 
Malawi 57 14 23 77.9 
Mauritius 224 18 66 38.4 
Somaha 56 9 4 95.0 
Swaziland 170 17 53 70.0 
Tanzania 82 9 23 85.0 
Uganda 98 6 33 74.9 
Zarn bla 264 I I 47 52.6 
Source: Survej- of Ecorzumrc Condli lon~ ln Afrlta, 1972, Part I (New York: Unlted Nations, 
1973), Table 1, p. 9. 
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lack of participation in economic activities and from the likely impact of 
governmental policies. 
The countries with which we are concerned had an estimated population 
of around two hundred and forty million people in 1970. Many of them are 
listed among the very poorest countries in the world today. Although most 
of them have experienced respectable economic growth rates since achieving 
independence, they have also had some of the world's highest rates of 
population growth. Table 1 indicates the genera1 level of development 
reached in various sub-Saharan countries by 1970. In almost half of them 
the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measured in 1960 U.S. dollars 
was $100 or less. In some of the really poor landlocked countries like Mali, 
Upper Volta, Chad, Rwanda, and Burundi, the per capita GDP was only 
on the order of $50. In only five of the countries did per capita GDP exceed 
$200, and in none did it reach as high as $500. It may also be noted that in 
about half the countries the share of manufacturing and crafts in GDP did 
not exceed 10% and in none did it reach 20%. In about half of the countries 
90% or more of the population aged fifteen and over is illiterate. Only two 
countries have achieved a literacy rate of better than 50% in this age group. 
In less than a third of the countries are even one-half of the school-age 
children attending school. These are indications that levels of development 
and income in sub-Saharan African are still extremely low and that even if 
there were no income inequalities the standard of living would be depres- 
singly low. It is with an awareness of this situation that many African 
leaders have declared that the chief problem they face is development, not 
income distribution. They seem to think, rightly or wrongly, that tackling 
both development and economic equality at the same time might risk 
achieving neither. 
11. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
An important clue to the income distribution in present-day Africa may 
be obtained from the prevailing occupational structure. The majority of 
the African labor force continues to be employed in low productivity sub- 
sistence agriculture. Data for 1970 indicate that in the independent black 
African countries about three-fourths of the labor force was engaged in 
agriculture.' This high percentage of the work force, however, produced 
only one-third of the gross domestic product in these countries. In other 
words, the output per member of the work force in agriculture was only 
one-sixth of the output per member of the work force in the rest of the 
economy. These figures cannot be assumed to be very precise, since most 
countries have only rough approximations of the output of subsistence 
agriculture. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the differential in 
productivity gives a rough order of magnitude of the differential in incomes. 
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Per capita income in agriculture in all likelihood is on the order of one- 
sixth of per capita income in the rest of the economy. 
There are obvious difficulties in generalizing about an  area as vast as 
tropical Africa, but some of the important factors which affect the income 
distribution within the agricultural sector should be noted. First, there is 
the question of the extent to which an enterprise or household is engaged in 
commercial or in subsistence agriculture or pasturage. A second factor, 
which is related to the first, is the size and productivity of the land at its 
disposal. A third factor is government policy, including trade and industri- 
alization policy, taxation, research aid, extension programs, transportation, 
and fertilizer subsidies. Government policies also have important implica- 
tions for the distribution of income between the agricultural and non- 
agricultural sectors. 
The distinction between commercial and subsistence agriculture in 
Africa can be made roughly on the basis of production for export and 
production for local consumption. Most of the agricultural work force is 
engaged in the production of food for local consumption, which does not 
enter into market channels. In the Ivory Coast, for instance, a country 
which has concentrated on the development of a diversified commercial 
agriculture, only 10% of the production of grains, roots, and tubers, the 
staple food crops, was marketed in 1965.3 There are, of course, locally 
marketed crops (including food and industrial crops such as cotton and 
tobacco), but their total value generally remains small by comparison with 
that of the big export crops such as cacao, coffee, tea, peanuts, palm 
products, rubber, bananas, and pineapples. Although there are a few 
countries, especially in East Africa, where export-oriented plantations are 
important, most of the export crops are produced by African farmers and 
peasants on relatively small holdings. Many of these small holders produce 
only small quantities for export and spend most of their resources on the 
production of food for their own subsistence. As a general rule, we may 
assume that the more important the production of commercial crops, the 
higher the income. Not infrequently, however, peasants in subsistence 
agriculture may hire out as wage laborers to  commercial farmers or to 
non-agricultural employers. 
It is probably fair to generalize that in those countries where export 
agriculture has expanded rapidly, income distribution in the agricultural 
sector has become more unequal. This result follows more or less inevitably 
from the uneven commercialization of agriculture. Those areas which are 
best suited for commerciai crops and which have best access to  urban or 
export markets tend to get an increasingly Iarge share of the total agricul- 
tural income. In West Africa this phenomenon tends to  favor the coastal 
and forest zones over the more arid northern zones. In the Ivory Coast, for 
instance, the monetary income of a peasant in the departemenr du Sud is 
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three times as high as that of a peasant in the departement du Nord.4 In the 
Cameroon, per capita monetary income in the cocoa growing zone in the 
south is four times as high as in North Cameroon. One might assume that 
some of this differential is offset by non-monetary income, but this is not 
the case. In the Cameroon, non-monetary income is twice as high in the 
south as in the north.5 Similar patterns exist within other coastal West 
African countries and between the coastal and the Sahelian countries. In 
general, the farther inland one goes, the lower the importance of commercial 
agriculture, and the lower the per capita income. Even in northern Nigeria, 
which is one of Africa's major commercial peanut growing areas, per capita 
income tends to be much lower than in the south. 
The distribution of land ownership is not a major factor in income dis- 
tribution in most African countries because of the widespread survival of 
communal ownership, with holdings allocated and periodically reallocated 
among families. Ethiopia, with its feudal land tenure system, and Kenya, 
with its white settlers, were important departures from the traditional 
pattern. Recent revolutionary reforms have abolished feudalism in Ethiopia 
and nationalized land ownership. Kenya has undergone a massive program 
of land registration and transfer of land ownership from European settlers 
to Africans. While this program has eliminated some of the colonial legacies 
of inequality of land ownership, it has but increased inequality among 
Africans. Kenyan agriculture now includes wealthy African plantation 
owners whose income is in the thousands of dollars, some medium-sized 
agricultural enterprises, and a broad mass of small holders and landless 
peasants whose income is $100 a year or less.6 The top layer is described by 
Colin Leys as men who "were linked professionally, socially and econom- 
ically to the foreign capitalist enclave, borrowing from foreign banks, 
having accounts with foreign equipment suppliers, holding directorships in 
foreign companies. Their farms were mostly run by salaried managers, in 
some cases Europeans." At the other end of the scale he finds " 'the peasant' 
masses, mostly now with freehold land titles, though with little access to 
capital, extension services or other inputs, and . . . a growing minority of 
landless laborers and squatters."7 The Kenya experience illustrates a 
distribution pattern which often follows decolonization measures: the 
overall structure of income distribution is not changed much, but nouveaux 
riches Africans replace non-Africans in many of the privileged positions. 
In most sub-Saharan countries government policies have resulted in 
distribution effects which favor the non-agricultural over the agricultural 
sector. In was noted earlier that during colonial times the African peasant 
often bore more than his share of the tax burden and received less than his 
share of government services. Decolonization has not relieved the agricul- 
tural sector from this unequal burden, even though in absolute terms some 
farmers and peasants may be better off. An important part of the tax 
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burden is passed on to the farmers through government agricultural pricing 
policies and duties. The export of agricultura1 produce is usually handled 
by official marketing boards. They buy the crops from the peasants through 
licensed buying agents and sell them on the international market. Although 
these boards were originally established for the purpose of stabilizing 
agricultural prices and incomes, they eventually became instruments for 
taxing the peasants through low producer prices. The surplus exacted from 
the peasants was partly transferred to the government and partly absorbed 
by commercial middlemen. In countries like Nigeria and Ghana, the 
marketing boards helped to build up substantial foreign exchange and 
capital surpluses during the 1950s." 
A pattern was thus established during the closing years of the colonial era 
of extracting a surplus from the peasants. With the coming of independence 
the new African governments understandably looked to this source of 
revenue for financing their rapidly rising administrative and developmental 
expenditures. The result was an irresistible tendency to put a maximum 
tax burden on the peasants, since there have been few alternative compar- 
able tax bases. In recent times Ghanaian cacao farmers have received less 
than one-third of the price for which their cacao sold on the world market.9 
Only in a country like Nigeria, where petroleum has become a major alter- 
native source of taxable surplus, has the government been able and willing 
to relieve the peasants. The federal government in Nigeria has taken over 
the marketing boards from the states, raised the official producer prices, 
and eliminated export duties. It is not yet clear, however, to what extent 
the implicit gains were passed on to the producers and to what extent they 
were absorbed by the buying agents acting as middlemen. It is axiomatic 
that to the extent that more favorable prices are passed on to the producers, 
they will benefit mainly the export farmers, resulting in increased income 
inequality within the agricultural sector. On the other hand, subsistence 
peasants need suffer no decline in absolute income as a result of the change 
in price policy. 
Another aspect of government policy that has worked against the agri- 
cultural sector in most African countries is the general pattern of heavily 
protected import substitution industrialization.'O The tendency of this 
policy is to raise the price of manufactured goods in relation to agricultural 
produce to the detriment of those working the land. Similarly, the bulk of 
governmental overhead expenditure has been for the benefit of the non- 
agricultural sector. Almost everywhere expenditures on rural amenities, 
such as schools, hospitals, pipe-borne water, sanitation, roads, and electri- 
fication lag far behind similar expenditures for urban areas. 
While this imbalance in government services has so far favored the non- 
agricultural sector, an increase in government spending on such items as  
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rural roads, fertilizer, and agricultural research may well increase income 
inequality within the agricultural sector. The introduction of high yield 
varieties, which brings down the cost and eventually the price of agricultural 
produce, may help mainIy the more enterprising commercial farmers who 
know how to take advantage of them; the largely subsistence peasant who 
markets only small quantities may be hurt by the lower price. He probably 
lacks the resources and the skills to grow the new varieties, which may require 
irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides. 
During the colonial era, most of the agricultural research and extension 
work was directed toward export crops. The benefits from this policy were 
reaped primarily by the overseas customers and international trading firms. 
Within Africa, the benefits, as noted earlier, went first to the marketing 
boards and middlemen and last to the export farmers. In recent years the 
research emphasis has shifted to the locally consumed food crops. The 
leadership of this effort is in the hands of organizations like the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Ibadan (Nigeria) and its affiliated 
governmental research stations in various countries. Although it is doubtful 
whether tropical staple food crops will see a "green revolution" of the kind 
associated with rice, wheat, and maize, there is reasonable hope for substan- 
tial yield improvements and protein enrichments. Such advances are essential 
to raise the African standards of nutrition and living, but in the short run 
they often entail increased income inequalities. 
In addition to the factors enumerated above, there %re historical circum- 
stances which have contributed to  regional income inequalities. This is 
notably the case in West Africa with regard to the differentials between the 
coastal and the inland areas. In most West African countries the southern 
zone came much more extensively under the influence of Christian mis- 
sionaries, and was therefore exposed to Western education. The northern 
areas were converted to Islam at an early date and resisted the inroads of 
Christianity and western schooling. Often colonial administrations "pro- 
tected" Islamic areas from Christian missionary inroads. Even where 
Koranic schools were established in the north, they did not go much beyond 
the teaching of Arabic and the Koran. Northerners were, therefore, less 
prepared than southerners to take advantage of economic opportunities 
arising from modernization. This legacy from colonial times has affected 
not only regional income distribution but also the distribution among 
ethnic groups. The uneven preparation of diverse ethnic groups to  share in 
the income opportunities created by development underlies much of the 
tribal tension that is encountered in many African countries. Opportunities 
for advancement and unequal preparation have thus created sources of 
conflict between ethnic groups that previously had little contact or  had 
harmonious relations. 
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111. THE NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
So far I have discussed mainly those factors which tend to affect the 
distribution of income within the agricultural sector, which includes most 
of the so-called traditional sector of the African economies. I turn now to 
an examination of the non-agricultural sector, which covers most of the 
modern sector. I have noted earlier the basic fact that per capita income 
is much higher in the modern than in the traditional sector. As in the case 
of agriculture, however, there are strong tendencies working toward income 
inequality within the non-agricultural sector. The main factors which affect 
income distribution in this sector are industrialization, the growth of the 
modern service industries, governmental employment, urbanization, and 
Africanization. 
The income distribution consequences of industrialization work mainly 
in favor of the enterprise owners, the resident foreign managers, and the 
foreign suppliers of equipment and parts. A secondary group of gainers is 
the relatively small number of indigenous people who gain employment in 
the new industries, especially at the managerial level. Because they are in a 
protected monopolistic position, these industries are able to pay relatively 
high wages. They are inclined to respond affirmatively to government or  
trade union pressures for higher wages and simply to pass on the higher 
costs to the consumers. Not only does such behavior redistribute income 
in favor of a minority employed in the monopolistic industries, but it locks 
the industries into a high-cost-high-price structure which greatly limits 
expansion and favors stagnation. Most governments are aware of these 
problems, but the situation is not one which can be easily altered. 
The mining industries are another branch of the modern sector which 
expanded rapidly after World War I1 and particularly after independence. 
Independent sub-Saharan Africa produces substantial quantities of petro- 
leum (Nigeria, Gabon), copper (Zaire, Zambia, Uganda), iron ore (Liberia, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Guinea), bauxite (Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, Ghana), tin concentrates (Nigeria, Zaire, Rwanda), diamonds 
(Zaire, Ghana, Sierra Leone), gold (Ghana, Zaire, Ethiopia), and phosphate 
rock (Togo, Senegal). There are some small-scaIe locally operated mines, 
but most of the mining enterprises involve highly sophisticated technology 
and large capital investments and are normally undertakings of large multi- 
nationalfirms. Because the operating methods are not highly labor-intensive, 
they do  not generate much employment. The distribution is thus weighted 
against returns to local labor, but in the case of the mineral industries the 
returns to the foreign firms are limited by the host countries' claims of rents, 
royalties, and profit taxes. How much the countries can claim depends, 
of course, on the profitability of the industry. 
The outstanding case is the petroleum industry, from which government 
revenue in Nigeria increased from Iess than one billion dollars in 1971 to 
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over seven billion in 1974. The distribution effects of this huge increase in 
revenue will depend heavily on the pattern of government spending and 
allocation to the states. The immediate effects in Nigeria seem to be working 
mainly in favor of the modern sector, particularly government employees, 
who have received substantial salary increases, averaging around 130% at 
the bottom of the scale and ranging from 70% to 100% at the top." These 
awards, which were announced at the end of 1974 but made retroactive to 
April 1, 1974,12 have unleashed tremendous pressures on the private 
sector to match the governmental pay increases. The result has been a 
serious acceleration of inflation, particularly of food prices, no doubt 
because rising costs of transport and handling reinforced an underlying 
trend of food production shortfalls in recent years. In all likelihood much 
of the recent increase in food prices will be absorbed by middlemen who 
control the means of transport and storage, with only a fraction passed on 
to the producers. Thus, while the immediate effects of the increased govern- 
ment revenue probably strongly favor those groups who are already the 
most privileged, this need not be the case in the Iong run. The new five-year 
plan (1975-1980) anticipates major expenditures for agriculture, rural 
development, and primary education, which should spread some of the 
benefits from the oil revenues to hitherto less favored groups. The allocation 
of federal revenue to the states has been made more equitable over the last 
year by greater attention to size of population and to need. 
The most rapidly expanding sector of the African economies since inde- 
pendence has been the service sector, and in particular government em- 
ployment. It  is also this sector which until now has offered the best salaries, 
especially for the educated young Africans streaming in increasing numbers 
from universities. Data for several francophone countries, given in table 2, 
show that average monthly pay in the tertiary or service sector is between 
two and four times the level in the primary, mainly agricultural sector. 
Differentials between the secondary or industrial sector and services are 
less but still very substantial. Particularly noteworthy is the differential 
between private and public employment in the tertiary sector. High-level 
government employment has been the most important avenue for upward 
economic and social mobility in post-colonial Africa. Because of the drive 
to Africanize all the senior positions previously held by colonial adminis- 
trators, there were unusual opportunities for rapid advancement in the 
early years of independence. The remuneration and benefit pattern that 
had been set by the colonial powers for their administrators was usually 
copied by the new countries, accounting in part for the high salary levels in 
relation to the rest of the economy. 
Among the groups that were in the best position to profit from the 
economic opportunities presented by independence were naturally those 
who were educated. A stratified sample survey of incomes of 1635 heads of 
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TABLE 2 
AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY 
(in CFA francs) 
TABLE 3 





AVERAGE INCOME OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS 
(in Relation to Level of Education in Nigeria in 1967) 
Educat~on Annual Income (Nigerian pounds) 
Illiterate 130 
Pr~mary 220 
Secondary 35 1 
Univers~ty 1543 
Cameroon 1971 
Source: Jacques Lecalllon and Dlmltr~os G e r m ~ d ~ s ,  "Les disparitCs de salaries au Sbnbgal, 
Cameroon, Madagascar, et CBte d'lvoire," in /LO Worlcl. Enlplov~nerzr Re~earch Workrng 





Source: 0. Aboyade,  income^ Profile, (Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 1973). p. 19. 
Madagascar 1965 
households in Nigeria in 1967, presented in table 3, reveals a particularly 
high return to university education (although the number of people in the 
sample with university degrees was rather small). The avenues for employ- 
ment opened up by education are reflected also in the fact that 98% of the 
illiterates and 90% of those with only primary education were self-employed, 
whereas only 35% of those with secondary education and none of the seven 
people with university education were self-employed. 
The Kenyan experience, although not necessarily representative, may 
nonetheless be taken as indicative for Africa as far as growth of employment 
opportunities in the pubIic sector is concerned. Between 1964 and 1970 the 
number of Africans employed in the public sector grew by 66,000, while 
over the same period the corresponding increase in wage employment in 
modern private industry and commerce was only 21,000.13 As is well known, 
it has been mainly the opportunities for wage employment which have 
attracted large numbers of laborers from the country to the city, The influx 
from the rural to the urban areas, however, has been much greater than the 
opportunities for employment. In Kenya, for instance, urban population 
privare pcthlrr 
9,583 n. a. 
25,333 n a. 
26,583 n. a. 
privore puhlrc 
4,4 13 4,816 
8,347 6,263 
9,890 1 1,660 
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has been growing at the rate of 10% per annum while recorded employment 
was growing at a rate of only 1.5%. Even though there were unrecorded 
employment opportunities in the so-called "informal sector," the problem 
of urban unemployment in Kenya is one of "appalling intensity and 
extent."l4 Estimates for Nairobi are that almost one-fourth of all adult 
males and over one-half of all adult females either are unemployed or  lack 
the opportunity of earning a reasonable minimum income. 1s 
Unemployment and very low earnings, often despite very long working 
hours, are major factors contributing to economic inequality in urban 
Africa. At the other end of the scale, a class of nouveaux riches is emerging 
in the rapidly growing African cities. Among them are the senior civil 
servants, senior military officers, executives and owners of large business 
establishments, and professional groups, especially lawyers. This class has 
access to finance and information, and to governmental permits and licenses. 
One source of rapid gains for them has been the skyrocketing real estate 
values in major cities like Lagos, Abidjan, and Nairobi. According to a 
recent estimate, land in central Lagos (Lagos Island) sells for around $600 
asquare yard, and office space rents for around $16 a square foot per annum. 
Modest accommodations on the Lagos mainland (Surulere) rent for around 
$5000 a year, but modern new houses on residential Victoria Island rent for 
around $30,000 a year, with rent paid five years in advance.16 Clearly, only 
well-to-do Nigerians can share in this development bonanza. The masses 
are left behind. In Lagos, as in other major African cities, there are daily 
reminders of deep-seated inequalities in the contrasts between spacious 
modern dwellings and overcrowded native quarters, between air-conditioned 
supermarkets and unsanitary local markets, between those who ride in 
chauffeur-driven Mercedes-Benzes and those who sweat in "mammy- 
waggons." 
There are indications that Africanization of assets and jobs may well 
tend to increase these inequalities. We have already noted that in Kenya 
Africanization of land ownership increased the wealth and income gap 
between rich and poor Africans. In other countries, policies with regard to 
Africanization of industry seem to have had similar effects. This is the 
judgment of a leading Nigerian scholar with regard to his country: "Rather 
than engender a redistribution of income, the indigenization policy will 
tend to concentrate a large amount of Nigeria's resources in the hands of a 
few highly placed, status-conscious and conspicuous-consumption-oriented 
class [sic] of Nigerians."t7 The note of disappointment in Professor Okediji's 
statement is widely shared among African intellectuals. 
The most important feature of Nigeria's indigenization policy is contained 
in the 1972 Indigenization Decree, which required that by March 3 1, 1974, a 
group of twenty-two specified industries (mainly small-scale industry, trans- 
port, retail trade, and services) had to  be completely owned by Nigerians, 
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and in another group of thirty-three industries, Nigerian ownership had to 
be at least 40% of each company. Although some exceptions were granted 
and a number of companies simply folded, the law has largely been carried 
out. Lucrative opportunities were thus created for Nigerians to  invest up to 
several hundred millions of dollars. As yet, no official report of the transfer 
has been made public, so that there is no direct evidence on the extent to 
which Nigerian ownership may have become concentrated. Disappointment 
has been created among unsatisfied would-be buyers, and suspicions have 
been aroused mostly by the secret nature of the transactions. The secrecy 
lends support to the suggestion "that companies were discouraged from 
going public so that some 'big shots' might buy them through private 
treaties."lB The fact is that only twenty-four of some eight hundred affected 
enterprises offered shares to'the public through the Lagos stock exchange.19 
Most enterprises were sold through private arrangements, no doubt mainly 
to people with access to large bank credits. One factor discouraging public 
sales was the very low prices of shares fixed by the Capital Issues Commis- 
sion, which invariably resulted in pricelearnings ratios below five and 
sometimes below one. Here was an opportunity for people with limited 
means to become small capitalists. With the exception of two companies, 
all public issues were heavily oversubscribed, from 300 to 800%. To  assure 
wide distribution, the authorities rationed out the purchases among the 
applicants. In the end, however, less than . I% of the population benefited 
from this widely publicized exercise in decolonization.20 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Even though the data presented in this paper are very impressionistic, 
there is no way one can avoid the general conclusion that after a decade and 
a half of independence, the distribution of wealth and income among indig- 
enous people in tropical Africa has become more unequal. This is hardly a 
surprising result, given the necessarily uneven nature of the development 
process and the very elementary state of the continent's economic develop- 
ment. On the other hand, there are many indications that inequality between 
Africans and non-Africans has decreased, which was after all one of the 
changes sought by independence. In most cases it is probably also true that 
the increase in inequality among Africans is primarily the result of more at 
the top than less at the bottom of the economic scale. The rich are getting 
richer, but the poor are not necessarily poorer. There is no hard evidence 
to show that the new urban poor are worse off than the traditional rural 
poor, although the former are more vocal than the latter. At present, 
Tropical African societies are generally still open. As yet, there is no 
hardening of the structure of inequality. If there are serious political dangers 
in economic inequality, they mostly still lie ahead. If present trends con- 
tinue, however, and if population keeps growing faster than the food supply 
and job opportunities, as has been the case in recent years, there is indeed 
cause for concern for the future welfare of the average African. Much more 
research is needed to get an accurate overall picture of the complex problems 
involved and to evaluate their implications. 
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